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1 Introduction
We examine the association between corporate governance provisions and the
incidence of conditional accounting conservatism. Conditional conservatism
imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition of economic gains
than for the recognition of economic losses, generating earnings that reflect bad
news in a timelier fashion than good news.1 In this paper we show that, within a
specific institutional or country level demand for accounting based contracts,
corporate governance is a significant determinant of firm specific variation in
conditional accounting conservatism. Our evidence indicates that the implementa
tion of stronger corporate governance provisions results in increased conditional
conservatism.
Accounting conservatism benefits the users of financial statements by constrain
ing managers’ opportunistic payments to themselves and to other parties, mitigates
agency problems associated with managerial investment decisions, increases debt
and other contracts agreement efficiency, facilitates the monitoring of contracts, and
reduces litigation costs (Watts 2003a, b; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Watts (2003a)
argues that the contracting and litigation explanations for the existence of
conservatism stem from the fact that the parties to the firm have asymmetric
information, asymmetric payoffs, limited liability, and different time horizons.2
Conservatism produces accounting numbers that can be used in contracts among the
parties to reduce these moral hazard problems. In addition, conservative accounting,
on average, defers earnings and generates lower net assets, likely reducing expected
litigation costs for the firm.
We posit that corporate governance provisions play an important role in the
implementation of accounting conservatism. Corporate governance is the set of
mechanisms in place to ensure that the assets of the firm are used efficiently,
guaranteeing the suppliers of finance a return on their investment (Shleifer and
Vishny 1997) and thus preventing the inappropriate distribution of these assets to
managers or other parties at the expense of the rest of the stakeholders. Accordingly,
adequate governance results in better monitoring of management. Because of the
previously mentioned roles of conservatism in mitigating agency costs and reducing
the litigation risk for directors, auditors, and managers, it is expected that efficient
1 Following Beaver and Ryan (2005), we refer to this news-dependent conservatism as conditional. Other
authors label it as ex post conservatism, income statement conservatism, or earnings conservatism.
Unconditional or news-independent conservatism—also labeled ex ante or balance-sheet conservatism—
in turn, refers to the persistent understatement of shareholders’ equity that results from historic cost
accounting and underrecognition of certain intangible assets due to the accounting rules (Feltham and
Ohlson 1995). In the paper, we only focus on conditional conservatism as it plays a clear role in the
contracting and monitoring functions of corporate governance. However, it is difficult to see how
contracting is affected by conservatism in the form of an unconditional accounting bias of known
magnitude. Rational agents would simply invert the bias. If the bias is unknown, it can only reduce
contracting efficiency (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).
2 Watts (2003b) argues that tax and regulation also contribute to conservatism; however, the empirical
evidence thus far offers more limited evidence on the contribution of these factors to conservatism.
2
corporate governance mechanisms will regard conservatism as a desirable property
of accounting numbers and will favor its implementation, demanding reliable
accounting information and accelerating the recognition of bad news. Conservative
accounting information provides early warning signals to governance bodies such as
the board of directors, promoting early investigation into the reasons for bad news.
We predict a positive association between the monitoring role of governance
mechanisms and conservatism. Specifically, we expect that the sensitivity of
earnings to bad news will be higher for firms with stronger corporate governance.
To measure the level of corporate governance, we develop a composite index that
takes into account both internal and external indicators, such as the exposure to the
market for corporate control and several characteristics of the functioning of the
board of directors. We classify firms as having strong (weak) governance if they
have low (high) levels of antitakeover protection and low (high) CEO influence on
board activity.3
To ensure the robustness of our results, we measure conservatism using three
proxies. The first one is market based, and the other two are accruals based. We also
take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance and the fact that
governance and conservatism may be simultaneously determined. Given the
evidence in Bushman et al. (2004), who find a reverse relation between governance
structures and the timeliness of earnings, we try to illuminate whether the direction
of causality flows from governance to conservatism or vice versa.
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1992 through 2003, we find that
strong (weak) governance firms exhibit a higher (lower) degree of conditional
conservatism. Specifically, we document that, compared with their weak gover
nance counterparts, strong governance firms have earnings that are significantly
timelier in recognizing bad news. Overall, the evidence is consistent with stronger
corporate governance structures demanding more conservative accounting infor
mation. Our results are also consistent with governance causing conservatism but
not vice versa, indicating that governance employs conservatism as a mechanism to
fulfill its monitoring role.
We also study whether these differences in the timeliness of earnings to bad news
across governance structures are driven by differences across firms in their use of
accruals. Using several accruals models, we decompose reported earnings into their
nondiscretionary and discretionary components. We find that the increase in
conservatism in strong governance firms is driven by the discretionary component
of reported earnings. However, we do not find a significant difference in the
sensitivity of nondiscretionary earnings to bad news between strong and weak
governance firms. Put together, this evidence is consistent with governance
characteristics determining managerial use of accruals to accelerate the recognition
of bad news.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the expected
association between corporate governance and conservatism. Section 3 contains the
research design, developing a metric of governance level and describing the
3 Our use of the expression strong (weak) governance is purely descriptive. It is not intended to mean that
strong governance is better than weak governance.
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measurement of conservatism and discretionary accruals. Section 4 introduces the
sample and presents summary univariate statistics. Section 5 discusses the main
results and robustness checks, and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Corporate governance and accounting conservatism
Corporate governance provisions appear as a result of the agency conflict that exists
between the parties to the firm. Classic agency theory models these relationships as
being fraught with conflicting interests (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Commonly, contracts are written between the parties
in an attempt to align their interests. However, these contracts fail to eliminate all
agency costs. First, the contracts cannot be complete and thus end up assigning
significant residual control rights to managers who, as a result, might expropriate
shareholders by, for example, entrenching themselves (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Second, oftentimes contracts are based on accounting numbers (Watts and
Zimmerman 1986), which creates incentives to expedite the recognition of gains
and choose aggressive accounting methods. Because of these pervasive differences
between the interests and incentives of managers, shareholders, and other providers
of finance, corporate governance mechanisms are put in place to reduce agency
problems by efficiently monitoring management and contracts.
Conservatism produces numbers that can be used in contracts to mitigate agency
costs. Conservative accounting reduces the tendency of managers with short term
horizons to invest in negative NPV projects, making managers aware that they will
not be able to defer the recognition of losses to the future (Ball and Shivakumar
2005) and imposing greater costs to biasing financial reports upwards (Guay and
Verrecchia 2006). Thus, conservative accounting can be used as a mechanism to
motivate managers to cut losses earlier and abandon poorly performing projects. In
addition, conservative accounting facilitates the monitoring of debt contracts that
can be written based on conservative numbers, triggering violations of debt
covenants faster (Watts 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar 2005).
Conservative accounting thus increases the efficiency of the contracting between
the parties to the firm by limiting the control rights of loss making managers and
transferring those rights back to the providers of finance earlier (Ball and
Shivakumar 2005). Therefore, the implementation of more conservative accounting
choices reduces, at least partly, the agency costs that permeate the relationships
amongst the parties to the firm.
Accounting conservatism also can reduce litigation risk. The asymmetric
recognition requirements for economic gains and losses are closely linked to
asymmetries in the loss function of directors and auditors: overstating (understating)
net assets or earnings is more (less) likely to generate litigation costs. Research on
auditor litigation shows that lawsuits against auditors are related to overstatements
of earnings or net assets (Kellog 1984; St. Pierre and Anderson 1984) or situations
of significant income increasing abnormal accruals (Heninger 2001).
We posit that the role of conservatism in mitigating agency costs coupled with its
role in reducing litigation risk for managers, directors, and auditors originate a
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demand for conservative accounting numbers at all levels of firm monitoring. Thus,
we predict that stronger, more stringent governance structures will favor the
implementation of conservative accounting choices. Corporate governance involve
ment in the implementation of conservatism is expected to occur both via the
demand from the providers of finance for conservative numbers and immediate
recognition of bad news and through the constraint of aggressive accounting choices
and practices.4
We expect that the success of corporate governance in implementing conserva
tism hinges vitally on the coordination between internal and external mechanisms.
We view effective monitoring as a combination of external and internal provisions.
The market for corporate control acts as the main external monitoring device (Fama
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), whereas efficient boards of directors and the presence
of block holders are the most salient internal provisions (Shleifer and Visnhy 1986).
It has been argued that the market for corporate control is the most efficient monitor
(Jensen 1993), but recent research shows that external and internal governance
mechanisms complement each other, and that both types of governance are
necessary to guarantee effective monitoring (Mikkelson and Partch 1997; Cremers
and Nair 2005).5 We expect that both sets of mechanisms will have a role in the
implementation of conservatism, as strong external monitoring will increase the
efficiency of internal governance mechanisms which, in turn, will be directly
responsible for day to day managerial monitoring.
Although there is scarce evidence on the links between conservatism and
governance, in line with our expectation that stringent corporate governance
provisions result in a higher demand for accounting conservatism, a recent paper by
Lobo and Zhou (2006) presents initial evidence of an increase in conservatism as a
result of the provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Also in a similar vein, the work
by Beekes et al. (2004) examines the link between accounting quality, measured by
earnings timeliness and earnings conservatism, and the proportion of outside
directors on the board of U.K. firms. Their results indicate that firms with a higher
proportion of outside directors recognize bad news in earnings on a timelier basis.
4 For example, internal governance mechanisms such as independent boards of directors and audit
committees have been shown to constrain aggressive practices, limiting the incidence of income-
increasing earnings management (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005). Similarly, recent
research shows that independent audit committees hire better quality auditors (Abbot et al. 2003) that, in
turn, impose more conservative accounting choices (Basu et al. 2001; Chung et al. 2003).
5 Literature on this field provides mounting evidence that efficient corporate governance results in lower
agency costs and that internal and external governance structures are associated to firm performance. For
example, Cremers and Nair (2005) show that firms with strong external and internal governance generate
abnormal returns of 10% to 15%. Core et al. (1999) find that less effective boards of directors—
characterized by the CEO holding the chairman position; larger size; directors appointed by the CEO; and
the presence of gray outside directors, old directors, and busy directors—are correlated with higher levels
of CEO compensation after controlling for economic determinants of compensation; moreover, they find
that predicted excess compensation, based on the governance structure of the firm, is negatively
correlated with stock returns 1, 3, and 5 years ahead.
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These results are confirmed by Ahmed and Duellman (2007) who document for a
U.S. sample that the percentage of inside directors is negatively related to
conservatism, and the percentage of outside directors’ shareholdings is positively
related to conservatism. These results are consistent with our prediction of a positive
relation between increased monitoring from corporate governance mechanisms and
conservatism.
Alternatively, conservatism could drive corporate governance. Bushman et al.
(2004) find that when earnings timeliness is low, boards adopt stronger
governance mechanisms as a substitute for high quality accounting information.
Even though their measure of earnings timeliness is not a measure of
conservatism, their findings seem to suggest that it is the absence of conservatism
that causes a strengthening in governance. This view helps explain investors’
demand for stronger governance provisions and the existence of stronger
governance mechanisms in firms that operate in complex, opaque environments.
Nevertheless, they do point out that it is possible that ‘‘the direction of causality
should be reversed’’ (p. 195). If this alternative view is accurate, then a negative
relation should be expected between governance and conservatism. However, we
expect this to be a feedback effect where governance reacts to the absence of
conservatism. Our results suggest this feedback effect to be relatively weak
compared with our predicted primary effect of a positive relation between
governance and conservatism.
3 Research method
3.1 Measurement of corporate governance quality
We develop a measure of total governance that incorporates attributes of external
and internal governance to build our index of governance and classify firms into
strong and weak governance structures. We measure the level of governance using
an approach similar to the one in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Davila and
Penalva (2006). Specifically, we develop a composite governance variable (Totgov)
that incorporates the level of antitakeover protection (external governance) and
several characteristics of the board’s structure (internal governance). The two types
of governance mechanisms (external and internal) are complementary, as both are
needed to achieve the desired effects (Cremers and Nair 2005). Our measure of total
governance combines the following four proxies:
1. External governance: We proxy the level of external monitoring using the
takeover protection index developed by Gompers et al. (2003). We follow
Cremers and Nair (2005) and interpret the index as a measure of takeover
vulnerability. Using data compiled by the Investors Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) and state takeover law data, Gompers et al. construct a firm
specific index by adding one point for every provision that reduces takeover
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vulnerability.6 Higher values of this index are associated with more protection
against takeovers. Cremers and Nair (2005) also use a narrower alternative
takeover index that only accounts for the three components of the IRRC data
that are critical to takeovers. They report that their results do not change and
conclude that there are no systematic biases in the Gompers et al. index, and
that it can be correctly interpreted as a measure of takeover protection.
2. CEO involvement: The Gompers et al. index does not capture information on
internal governance, such as board characteristics. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998, 2003) argue that the main factor affecting the board’s effectiveness is its
independence from the CEO. Expanding this argument, we include an indicator
variable that takes on the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the
board and zero otherwise. The CEO has more influence on governance when
the same person holds the CEO and chairman titles.
3. Board composition: Previous research finds that independent directors
positively influence board decisions. Weisbach (1988) shows that the presence
of outside directors is positively related to CEO removal decisions. Byrd and
Hickman (1992) find that bidding firms on which independent outside directors
hold at least 50% of the seats have significantly higher announcement date
abnormal returns than other bidders. As a second proxy for internal governance,
we include the proportion of top executives who serve on the board. Higher
proportions of executives on the board are associated with higher CEO
influence on governance.
4. Board effectiveness: Adams (2000) and Vafeas (1999) suggest that the number
of board meetings is a good proxy for the directors’ monitoring effort. We
include the inverse of this variable where a higher value is associated with
lower board effectiveness.
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we define the composite governance
variable (Totgov) by taking the unweighted average of the standardized variables.7
The standardization is performed to take into account the different scales of the
variables that make up the composite measure. Higher values of Totgov are
expected to be associated to governance structures with higher antitakeover
protection and high CEO influence on board decisions. For brevity, we refer to these
structures as weak governance. Conversely, governance structures with low
antitakeover protection and low CEO involvement in board decisions are referred
to as strong governance. These meanings are attached to the terms ‘‘weak
governance’’ and ‘‘strong governance’’ throughout the paper.
6 Gompers et al. (2003) examine 24 provisions: anti-greenmail, blank-check preferred stock, business
combination laws, bylaw and charter amendment limitations, classified board, compensation plans with
change in control provisions, director-indemnification contracts, control share cash-out laws, cumulative
voting requirements, director’s duties, fair-price requirements, golden parachutes, director indemnifica-
tion, limitations on director liability, pension parachutes, poison pills, secret ballots, executive severance
agreements, silver parachutes, special meeting requirements, supermajority requirements, unequal voting
rights, and limitations on action by written consent.
7 Like Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we use unit weights to construct Totgov following the
recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), who find that unit-weighted composites exhibit better
psychometric properties than alternative weighting schemes.
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3.2 Measurement of accounting conservatism
To test the association between corporate governance quality and accounting
conservatism, we analyze conservatism using three different proxies. This section
describes the measures used to capture conditional conservatism.
3.2.1 Conditional conservatism based on Basu (1997)
Our first measure of conservatism is based on Basu’s (1997) measure. Under
conservative accounting, earnings capture bad news faster than good news because
of the asymmetric standards of verification of losses and gains. Basu uses stock
returns to proxy for good and bad news. Stock prices incorporate all the information
arriving in the market from multiple sources in a timely fashion, including reported
earnings. Therefore, stock price changes are a measure of news arrival during the
period. Because earnings are timelier in recognizing bad news than good news, Basu
expects to find a higher association of earnings with negative returns (his bad news
proxy) than with positive returns (the good news proxy). We use Basu’s regression
as follows (firm sub indexes are understood):
Xt ¼ b0 þ b1Dt þ b2Rt þ b3DtRt þ lt ð1Þ
where Xt is earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations deflated by share price at the beginning of the period; Rt is the stock rate
of return of the firm, measured by compounding 12 monthly CRSP stock returns
ending the last day of fiscal year t; Dt is a dummy variable that equals one in the
case of bad news (negative or zero market adjusted stock rate of return) and zero in
the case of good news (positive market adjusted stock rate of return). The
coefficient b3 measures the level of asymmetric timeliness of conservatism and
it is expected to be positive and significant.8
In a recent study, Dietrich et al. (2007) claim that the Basu specification is biased
and that inferences based on it should not be relied upon. The bias seems to be
caused by the method used to partition the sample and by the choice of deflator for
the variables in the regression. For these reasons, they suggest the use of alternative
measures to validate the robustness of inferences drawn with the Basu approach. We
do so in Sect. 3.2.2, in which we follow Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and use their
measure of conditional conservatism based on the relation between accruals and
cash flows, and in Sect. 3.2.3, in which we use a measure developed by Givoly and
Hayn (2000) based on the accumulation of operating accruals.
8 Prior studies (Givoly et al. 2007; Callen et al. 2006) express their distrust of inferences drawn from the
Basu (1997) model if used in a time-series (firm-specific) approach. We use a cross-sectional approach.
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Despite the concerns raised by Dietrich et al. (2007), Ryan (2006) argues that the
biases introduced by the Basu approach are likely to be small.9 To ameliorate these
concerns, we follow the recommendations of Ryan (2006) and use market adjusted
returns, defined as raw returns minus the value weighted CRSP market return, to
create the partitioning dummy variable D in the Basu regression. The reason for
using adjusted returns to partition the sample instead of raw returns, as is more
common in the conservatism literature, is the evidence in Dietrich et al., who show
that partitioning a regression sample with one of the regressors (Rt) may produce
biased inferences. They also argue that inferences from Basu’s reverse regression
might be biased due to earnings driving returns. As an additional precaution,
following Ryan (2006), we measure returns over the fiscal year. This partially
removes the impact of the annual earnings announcement over stock prices, which
occurs approximately 3 months after closing. However, we report that our
inferences are not affected by the use of raw or adjusted returns or by the choice of
the measurement window.10
Although the evidence in Dietrich et al. highlights that additional research is
needed regarding which is the proper specification of earnings returns regressions to
measure conditional conservatism, the results of prior research support the notion
that the potential biases are small. In fact, there is a wealth of recent research that
uses the Basu measure of conservatism (Pope and Walker 1999; Ball et al. 2000,
2003; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ryan and Zarowin 2003;
Raonic et al. 2004; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Roychowdhury and Watts 2006;
among many others), that obtains empirical evidence in accordance with the extant
theories. Many of these theories have also been supported by research designs that
do not rely on the Basu approach. In our case, the results are not affected by the
method used to measure conditional conservatism, and the three approaches yield
identical inferences consistent with good governed firms showing higher conditional
conservatism.
To assess whether there are significant differences across governance structures,
we modify Eq. 1 to include the level of total governance, Totgov, as an interaction
term as follows:
9 Ryan (2006, Footnote 2) states that ‘‘two well-known empirical results together imply the biases
identified by Dietrich et al. are likely to be fairly small and so biases in returns-based measures of
asymmetric timeliness are likely to be correspondingly small. First, the low R2s observed in
contemporaneous returns-earnings regressions suggest that the extent to which earnings causes returns
is tiny compared to the extent to which both variables are determined by other, more primitive
information. Second, a large literature, only some of which employs the reverse regressions of earnings
on returns used to estimate asymmetric timeliness, exists that shows returns typically reflect information
on a timelier basis than earnings.’’
10 Basu uses the annual stock rate of return measured from 9 months before fiscal year end t to 3 months
after fiscal year-end t. However, most subsequent studies use the fiscal year. Measuring returns 3 months
after fiscal year-end is aimed at giving time to the market to incorporate information in contemporaneous
earnings. Using fiscal year returns avoids returns being distorted by new information (different from
earnings) coming to the market. Our results are not affected by this choice.
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Xt ¼ b0 þ b1Dt þ b2Totgovt þ b3Rt þ b4DtTotgovt þ b5RtTotgovt þ b6DtRt
þ b7DtRtTotgovt þ lt ð2Þ
We expect to observe differences in conservatism between strong and weak
governance firms, that is, firms with low and high values of Totgov, respectively. In
particular, we hypothesize that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient b6 will be
positive and significant and that b7 will be negative. Thus, the total conservatism
(b6 + b7) of weak governance firms will be smaller than that of strong firms,
because higher values of Totgov are associated with weaker governance.
3.2.2 Conditional conservatism based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
Our second measure of conservatism is based on the approach suggested by Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) who use regressions based on accruals and cash flows. This
approach presents the advantage of not relying on market measures, thereby
reducing the risk of drawing incorrect inferences due to market inefficiencies.
The asymmetrical treatment of economic gains and losses also generates an
asymmetry in accruals. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that the negative
association between earnings and operating cash flows first documented by Dechow
(1994) is less pronounced in bad news periods as a consequence of the asymmetric
verification requirements to recognize good and bad news in earnings. Economic
losses are likely to be recognized on a timely basis through unrealized accruals,
while economic gains are recognized when realized and thus accounted for on a
cash basis. To test the asymmetry in accruals Ball and Shivakumar propose the
following model:
Accrt ¼ b0 þ b1DCFOt þ b2CFOt þ b3CFOtDCFOt þ lt ð3Þ
where Accr denotes annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary
items minus cash flow from operations and where both variables are extracted from
the statement of cash flows. Accr and CFO are both scaled by average total assets.
To control for the great variation in the type and size of accruals across industry
groups, we adjust Accr and CFO by subtracting the two digit SIC industry mean of
each variable every year. DCFO is a dummy variable equal to one in the case of
negative CFO and zero otherwise. In this model, b2 is expected to be significantly
negative showing the expected negative correlation between accruals and cash
flows, and b3 is expected to be significantly positive in the presence of conditional
conservatism, showing a positive contemporaneous association between cash flows
and accruals in bad news periods, that is, that accrued losses are more likely in
periods of negative cash flows.
As before, we augment the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model by interacting all
variables with total governance, Totgov, as follows:
Accrt ¼ b0 þ b1DCFOt þ b2Totgovt þ b3CFOt þ b4DCFOtTotgovt
þ b5CFOtTotgovt þ b6DCFOtCFOt þ b7DCFOtCFOtTotgovt þ lt ð4Þ
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We expect to observe differences in conservatism between strong and weak
governance firms. In particular, we hypothesize that the asymmetric timeliness
coefficient b6 will be positive and significant and that b7 will be negative. Thus, the
total conservatism (b6 + b7) of weak governance firms will be smaller than that of
strong firms, because higher values of Totgov are associated with weaker
governance.
3.2.3 Conditional conservatism based on Givoly and Hayn (2000)
Our third measure of conservatism is based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) who find
that higher accounting conservatism results in more negative total accruals. To
reduce the effect of temporary large accruals, which tend to reverse in one or two
years (Richardson et al. 2005), our measure of conservatism, AvgAccrt, is defined
as the three year average of total accruals, over a period centered at year t. This
measure presents two advantages: it is not market based, and it is firm year
specific. The measure is not industry adjusted as we explicitly control for industry
effects in all our regression analyses. Notice that AvgAccrt is a measure of total
conservatism, rather than conditional conservatism. However, only conditional
conservatism has a clear governance role (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Therefore,
to the extent that this measure captures conditional conservatism with some noise,
it would induce a bias against finding an association between governance and
conservatism.
To assess the impact of governance on conservatism, we use the following
specification:
AvgAccrt ¼aTotgovt1 þ bControlst1 þ cIndustry dummies
þ dYear dummies þ lt
ð5Þ
In further tests of robustness, we also estimate this equation in levels and
changes, adding up to three lags of AvgAccr and Totgov. Specifying the equation in
changes minimizes the effect of omitted variables that remain relatively constant
over time such as industry variables and firm specific factors. We expect coefficient
a to be significantly positive as weaker governance (that is, higher values of Totgov)
is associated with lower conservatism (that is, more positive AvgAccr).
The control variables, Controls, are a vector of determinants of conservatism
considered in previous research (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2004): firm
size, cash flow variability, sales variability, length of the operating cycle, intangibles
intensity, absence of intangibles, and capital intensity. We measure the determinants
as in Francis et al. (2004). Firm size is the log of total assets (LogAssets). The proxy for
cash flow variability is the standard deviation of the firm’s rolling 10 year cash flows
from operations (StdCFO), scaled by total assets. Sales variability is computed as the
standard deviation of rolling 10 year sales revenues (StdSales), scaled by total assets.
The length of the operating cycle is measured as the log of the sum of the firm’s days of
receivables and days of inventory (OperCycle). The intensity of intangibles is captured
by the sum of the firm’s reported R&D and advertising expenses (Int Intensity), scaled
by total sales (missing values of these items are set to zero). The absence of intangibles
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is measured with an indicator variable (Int Dummy) that takes on the value of one if the
intensity of intangibles is zero, and zero otherwise. Capital intensity is calculated as the
gross book value of property, plant, and equipment (Cap Intensity) scaled by total
assets. We also include an indicator variable (Big 5) that equals one if the firm’s
auditor is one of the Big Five, and zero otherwise. Finally, two digit SIC industry and
fiscal year indicator variables are also added.11
3.3 Governance self selection issues
Our main hypothesis is that governance and conservatism are positively associated
because governance structures demand conservatism to achieve the desired
monitoring and control benefits. However, there is an alternative hypothesis that
yields the opposite prediction. Management may try to compensate for otherwise
weak governance by strengthening conditional conservatism, generating a negative
association between governance and conservatism. In certain contexts, this could be
an optimal arrangement for the firm. For example, consider a situation in which
firm specific expertise at the board level is relatively important (for example, the
firm manufactures a very sophisticated product). In this case, considering the
board’s dual duty of advising and monitoring, the firm may benefit from having on
its board a higher proportion of executives, capable of providing sound technical
advice. To the extent that this reduces the board’s monitoring ability, the firm may
increase conservatism so that external parties can better oversee management. In
this situation, weak governance and high conservatism go hand in hand.12 However,
it is unlikely that this is the case in most firms. If our sample contains a few firms in
a situation like the one just described, this would work against our main hypothesis.
Discriminating between the two competing hypotheses becomes an empirical
question that we revisit in Sect. 5.
The above illustration of the alternative hypothesis highlights that governance is
an endogenous variable because it depends on firm and contracting environment
characteristics, and some of these characteristics may also drive the degree of
accounting conservatism. Because the selection of the level of governance is not
random, not controlling for this potential self selection problem may bias the
inferences in an unknown direction, particularly in levels regressions.
To reduce this risk we use the two step Heckman (1979) procedure. In the first
stage, governance choice is modeled using a probit model. In particular, we regress
a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has selected either to have strong
or weak governance on a set of determinants. We define strong (weak) governance
as having values of Totgov below (above) the median of this variable. In the second
stage, we estimate the Eqs. 1 5 including as an additional control variable the
inverse Mills ratio computed from the parameters of the first stage.
11 The inclusion of additional control variables such as the incidence of losses and earnings variability
(Francis et al. 2004) does not change the inferences. Neither does including as a proxy for growth
opportunities, the book-to-market value of assets ratio. We exclude this last variable because it also
captures a certain degree of conservatism.
12 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight.
12
The determinants of governance are taken from previous literature: firm size
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985); growth opportunities (Smith and Watts 1992); firm age
(Bushman et al. 2004); free cash flow (Jensen 1986; Lang et al. 1991); idiosyncratic
risk (Demsetz and Lehn 1985); leverage (Cremers and Nair 2005); industry
concentration and geographic concentration (Bushman et al. 2004); CEO tenure
(Hermalin 2005); firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Demsetz and
Lehn 1985); auditor size (Basu et al. 2001); regulated industry (Demsetz and Lehn
1985; Bushman et al. 2004); high tech industry (Chandra et al. 2004). Finally, we
include indicator variables for the fiscal year. Appendix 1 contains the measurement
details of each variable.
3.4 Use of discretionary accruals across governance structures as a signaling
mechanism
Research on corporate governance has found that firms with weak governance
structures engage in more earnings manipulation, that is, they have lower quality
earnings and accruals (for example Dechow et al. 1996; Becker et al. 1998; Klein
2002; Peasnell et al. 2005). However, Bowen et al. (2004) find that, on average,
variation across governance structures in the use of discretionary accruals is not
driven by opportunistic reasons; rather, accruals are used as a signal to convey
information to the market. This is consistent with managers using discretionary
accruals to make accounting information more relevant, aligning earnings and
returns (Guay et al. 1996). Based on these findings, we hypothesize that stronger
governance structures provide managers with incentives to make more conservative
accounting choices by using discretionary accruals. To test this prediction, we run
Eqs. 2, 4, and 5, taking into account the possible effect of earnings discretion on
asymmetric timeliness.
To disentangle the effects of earnings discretion and conservatism, we start from
the simple accounting equality that earnings equal cash flows plus total accruals
(Xt = CFOt + TACCt). Given that cash flows are typically considered objective
evidence (easy to verify information), differences in conservatism across firms are
accomplished through accruals. Accountants will use accruals to make earnings
timelier.13 Accruals can be further decomposed into nondiscretionary (normal) and
discretionary (abnormal) components. Several discretionary accruals models are
used in the literature, and there is currently much debate on the appropriateness of
the different methods. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter this controversy.
We estimate discretionary accruals using four methodologies as a check for
robustness: the (i) total and (ii) working capital accruals versions of the modified
Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al. 1995), the (iii) Kasznik (1999) model and the
(iv) lagged return on assets modification suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). In this
13 Managers may also manipulate the timing and level of cash flows (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Bushee
1998; Bartov 1993), however, due to its low flexibility and high visibility, this is expected to be a residual
form of earnings management (Peasnell et al. 2000).
13
way, we expect to minimize the likelihood of our results being driven by the
particular choice of discretionary accruals estimation method.
To perform our tests on the influence of earnings discretion on conservatism
across governance structures, we replace the dependent variable in Eqs. 1 5, as in
Garcı´a Lara et al. (2005), with its pre discretionary accruals version. For instance,
for the dependent variable of the Basu approach, the dependent variable becomes
Xt* (=Xt DAXt), where DAX is one of the estimated proxies for discretionary
accruals. If discretionary accruals are one of the tools used by management to
achieve a higher level of conservatism in strong governance firms, we do not expect
to find significant differences in the asymmetric timeliness coefficient across
governance structures when the dependent variable in the regression of interest is
measured removing the effect of discretionary accruals (Xt*, Accrt*, AvgAccrt*).
4 Sample description
Accounting data are taken from the 2003 version of Compustat. Market return data
are taken from CRSP. Board characteristics and CEO data come from the 2003
version of Execucomp. The antitakeover protection index constructed by Gompers
et al. (2003) with IRRC data was downloaded from Andrew Metrick’s web page.14
The Execucomp and the IRRC data cover approximately 1,500 firms that make up
the S&P 500, MidCap and SmallCap indices. We eliminate firms with a negative
book value of equity and firms in the financial sector (SIC 6000 6999) because the
discretionary accrual methods are not appropriate for these firms. To reduce the
adverse effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized annually at the top
and bottom percentile of their distributions. The intersection of these databases and
the additional data requirements yield a sample that contains 9,152 firm year
observations for the period 1992 through 2003, corresponding to 1,611 different
firms.
Table 1 contains the summary statistics of the variables used in our tests of the
association between conservatism and governance. Panel A contains the variables
used in the Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) regressions and the
governance variables. Panel B contains the variables used in the Givoly and Hayn
(2000) regression, which uses a firm year measure of conservatism and control
variables. In Panel B, the reduction in sample size to 6,297 observations is due to the
additional data requirements of some variables which require 10 continuous years of
observations. The summary statistics for firms in the sample indicate that, on
average, they have nine antitakeover provisions, the board meets seven times per
year, 32% of the board is made up of executives, and the CEO is also the chairman
14 Our data covers the period 1992 through 2003. The IRRC data is only available for 1990, 1993, 1995,
1998, 2000, and 2002. Gompers et al. (2003) report that for the majority of firms there is little time-series
variation in the index. Taking advantage of this fact, like Cremers and Nair (2005), we align the index
values available for 1990 with firm data for 1992, the index values for 1993 with firm data for 1993 and
1994, the index values for 1995 with firm data for 1995, 1996, and 1997, the index values for 1998 with
firm data for 1998 and 1999, the index values for 2000 with firm data for 2000 and 2001, and the index
values for 2002 with firm data for 2002 and 2003.
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of the board 73% of the time. The mean market to book ratio is 3.4, indicating the
presence of substantial conservatism and growth opportunities. Consistent with the
existence of conservatism, earnings are negatively skewed (medians exceed means).
We observe the same phenomenon in industry adjusted accruals (Accr) which are
negatively skewed and in earnings and accruals before discretionary accruals. The
firm level proxy of conservatism (AvgAccr) is strongly negative, 5.77, consistent
with the presence of conservatism. As for the control variables, the average log of
total assets is 7.41 ($1,656 million) indicating that sample firms are fairly large, and
the mean of the variability in operating cash flows and sales is 0.06 and 0.17
respectively. The mean operating cycle is equivalent to 105 days. The mean value
of the intangibles intensity is 0.05, and 40% of the sample firms report zero
expenditures in R&D and advertising (intangibles dummy). The average gross
capital intensity equals 0.75. Finally, almost 98% of the sample firms are audited by
a Big Five auditor.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Differences in conditional conservatism across governance structures
and the influence of earnings discretion
Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of Eqs. 2 and 4 that assess the
association between governance and conservatism. The table shows the estimation
results using pooled Heckman regressions, which take into account the endogeneity
of governance choice. The first stage probit regression results are reported in
Appendix 1 and then omitted from the Tables for parsimony. The z statistics
reported in the regressions are based on standard errors robust to both heterosced
asticity and within group serial correlation (Rogers 1993).
Panel A shows the results for the Basu conservatism proxy. When the dependent
variable is earnings, X, the b6 coefficient that captures asymmetric timeliness is
positive and significant; the b7 coefficient is negative and also significant, indicating
that weak governance (that is, high Totgov) is associated with lower conditional
conservatism. It is worthwhile to notice the small size (0.01) of the positive returns
coefficient b3 and the much larger size of the negative returns coefficient b6 (0.07).
This is consistent with recent evidence (Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000). Interpreting
this evidence, Watts (2003b, p. 292) concludes that in recent years ‘‘U.S. firms’
accounting earnings are not timely at all in reflecting good news but are timely in
reflecting bad news.’’ However, when the dependent variable is earnings before
discretionary accruals, X*, the coefficient b7 becomes insignificantly different from
zero, suggesting that there is no difference in conservatism once discretionary
accruals are removed.15 This is in agreement with our prediction that managers of
firms with strong governance will use the discretion inherent to the estimation of
15 For parsimony, we only report the results that use the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) to
estimate discretionary accruals. The results are not affected by the choice of accruals estimation method.
17
Table 2 Heckman estimation of the asymmetric timeliness across governance structures. Assessing
asymmetric timeliness as a function of the level of total governance. Estimation of the Basu (1997) and
the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) regressions interacted with the governance proxy Totgov
Panel A Dependent variable Panel B Dependent variable
X X* Accr Accr*
Constant b0 0.02 0.00 Constant b0 0.01 0.01
z-stat 5.27 0.26 z-stat 2.03 0.37
D b1 0.01 0.01 DCFO b1 0.01 0.00
z-stat 3.81 1.59 z-stat 3.83 0.44
Totgov b2 0.02 0.00 Totgov b2 0.01 0.00
z-stat 2.60 0.22 z-stat 1.67 0.30
Return b3 0.01 0.03 CFO b3 0.36 0.18
z-stat 2.34 3.54 z-stat 10.03 3.76
D 9 Totgov b4 0.02 0.00 DCFO 9 Totgov b4 0.01 0.00
z-stat 2.11 0.00 z-stat 1.63 0.22
Return 9 Totgov b5 0.01 0.02 CFO 9 Totgov b5 0.02 0.08
z-stat 0.79 1.44 z-stat 0.29 0.89
D 9 Return b6 0.07 0.04 DCFO 9 CFO b6 0.24 0.26
z-stat 5.02 2.60 z-stat 2.72 2.63
D 9 Return
9 Totgov
b7 0.07 0.04 DCFO 9 CFO
9 Totgov
b7 0.46 0.20
z-stat 2.53 1.50 z-stat 2.64 0.83
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 12.11 5.56 Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 3.50 0.40
The sample consists of 9,152 firm-year observations (1,611 firms) for the years 1992 through 2003. In
Panel A, X is earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by share
price at the beginning of the period. X* is earnings before discretionary accruals deflated by share price at
the beginning of the period. The discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model of
Dechow et al. (1995). R is the annual stock return measured as the continuously compounded monthly
CRSP return over the firm’s fiscal year. D is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of bad news
(negative or zero market-adjusted stock rate of return); zero otherwise. In Panel B, Accr denotes industry-
adjusted annual total accruals, deflated by average assets, defined as income before extraordinary items
minus cash flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash flows.
Accr* denotes industry adjusted annual nondiscretionary accruals, deflated by average assets, where the
discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model. CFO is industry-adjusted cash flow
from operations taken from the statement of cash flows, deflated by average assets. DCFO is a dummy
variable equal to one in the case of negative CFO and zero otherwise. In both Panels, Totgov is a
summary measure of total governance. High (Low) values of Totgov indicate high (low) antitakeover
protection and high (low) CEO involvement in board decisions. The (unreported) first stage of the
Heckman procedure models governance choice with a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has
selected to have strong or weak governance. Strong (weak) governance denotes that the firm has a total
governance score below (above) the median of Totgov. The determinants of governance choice are size,
growth opportunities, firm’s age, presence of large free cash flows, idiosyncratic risk, leverage, industry
concentration, geographic concentration, CEO tenure, firm’s stock performance, whether the firm is in a
regulated industry, whether the firm is in a high technology industry, whether the firm is audited by a Big
Five auditor, and indicator variables for the fiscal year
The reported z-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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accruals, in addition to other means, to increase the level of conditional
conservatism.
The inverse Mills ratios of both regressions are significant, justifying the
endogeneity concerns. However, if we repeat the estimation of these regressions
without including the inverse Mills ratios or using Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean
annual regressions, the inferences do not change.16 The same is true when we
employ the methodology of Roychowdhury and Watts (2006). These authors show
that the Basu proxy is a better measure of conservatism when estimated
cumulatively over several periods, as it reduces the influence of rents on the
asymmetric timeliness coefficient. Following these authors, we repeat our previous
tests estimating the Basu measure by cumulating earnings and returns over the past
three years. The inferences drawn from Panel A of Table 2 are identical. This
confirms that our previous findings are not driven by the noise contained in the Basu
measure.
To further address the concerns raised by Dietrich et al. (2007) about Basu’s
conservatism proxy, we alternatively substitute price deflated accruals and price
deflated cash flow for price deflated earnings in the Basu regression Eq. 2. Given
our hypothesis that stronger governance leads to more conservative accounting
choices and that these choices are implemented through accruals, we should expect
that, if Basu’s model correctly captures conservatism, the b7 coefficient of the
governance interaction term would be smaller in the regression using cash flow as a
dependent variable. Untabulated results confirm this notion. In fact, b7 is
insignificantly different from zero in the cash flow specification (p value = 0.468),
while it is significantly negative in the accruals specification (p value = 0.004). This
confirms that Basu’s proxy is not seriously affecting the inferences about the
presence of conditional conservatism and that the biases documented by Dietrich
et al. seem to be small in our sample, as predicted by Ryan (2006). Overall, this
evidence is consistent with (1) a positive association between the quality of
corporate governance and conditional conservatism, (2) accruals playing a
significant role in the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, and (3) strongly governed
firms using their discretion over accruals to make earnings timelier to bad news.17
Panel B of Table 2 depicts the results of the pooled Heckman estimation of
regression (4). As predicted, when the dependent variable is accruals, the coefficient
that captures asymmetric timeliness, b6, is positive and significant, and the
coefficient that shows the association of governance and conservatism, b7, is
significantly negative, indicating that weak governance reduces conditional
16 Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions should be interpreted with caution. Basu (1999) gives a number
of reasons against the use of mean annual regressions, related mainly to the parameters not being
stationary.
17 Our estimate of discretionary accruals is based on the modified Jones model. This model only controls
for two simple relations: between accruals and sales and accruals and property, plant, and equipment. This
model would rarely capture other possible drivers of conservatism such as special items (restructuring
charges and other one-time items). Managers also may use special items to affect conservatism. To assess
this possibility, we augment earnings and the discretionary accruals estimate by adding the special items
(Compustat item #17) deflated by beginning-of-the-period market value of equity. Then, we repeat the
tests in Panel A of Table 2. Untabulated results indicate that the inferences still hold.
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conservatism. If we remove the effect of discretion in accruals, in the last column of
Panel B we can observe that coefficient b7 becomes insignificant. The inverse Mills
ratio of the first regression is also significant, confirming the appropriateness of the
self selection controls. However, repeating these tests without this control does not
alter the conclusions. We also obtain the same result using Fama and MacBeth
regressions.
We also conduct a sensitivity test of the total governance measure Totgov. We
want to assess the individual contribution of the external and internal governance
components of the measure, as they might be closely related. For instance, external
governance is likely to lead to internal governance. Therefore, we construct a
measure of internal governance taking the average of the three proxies of internal
governance and a measure of external governance using only the standardized
Gompers et al. (2003) index. Then, we estimate Eqs. 2 and 4 substituting
alternatively internal governance and external governance for total governance. The
untabulated results indicate that both components contribute significantly, as the
interaction coefficient b7 is always negative and significant, confirming that both
internal and external governance play a significant role in the implementation of
conditional conservatism.
Table 3 contains the estimation of Eq. 5, which uses a firm level proxy of
conditional conservatism. This regression presents the additional advantage of
allowing for the direct inclusion of control variables that may affect the level of
conservatism. The first column shows that coefficient a is strongly positive and
significant, confirming our prediction of a positive association between governance
and conservatism.18 The inverse Mills ratio of this regression is highly significant,
consistent with the presence of endogeneity in governance. Nevertheless, removing
the inverse Mills ratio from the tests does not alter the inferences. If we remove the
effect of discretion in our conservatism proxy, in the second column we observe that
the significance of coefficient a goes away, and it even has the wrong sign. This is
one more piece of evidence consistent with managers using discretionary accruals to
affect the level of conservatism. For completeness, in Appendix 2 Panels A to C, we
report the results of estimating models (2), (4), and (5) respectively using
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. The coefficients b7 in Panels A and
B, and a in Panel C that capture the association between governance and conditional
conservatism are significant and with the correct sign.
To summarize, in this section we tested the association between governance and
conditional conservatism using three different proxies of conservatism (market
based and nonmarket based), with and without controls for potential problems of
self selection of governance choice, and applying different methodologies. All the
tests confirm our main hypothesis of a positive association between governance and
conservatism and reject the alternative hypothesis described in Sect. 3.3. Moreover,
even though the sample may contain firms that try to compensate for otherwise
weak governance by increasing conservatism (that is, yielding a negative
association), this does not seem to be the case for the majority of firms. The fact
18 We also repeated this test including an industry 9 year interaction term and obtained the same
inferences.
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Table 3 Heckman estimation of the impact of governance on a firm-level proxy of conservatism using a levels
specification
Dependent variable
AvgAccr AvgAccr*
Totgov a 1.01 -0.51
z-stat 2.95 -1.39
LogAssets b1 -0.16 -0.05
z-stat -1.93 -0.63
StdCFO b2 -13.96 2.29
z-stat -4.33 0.77
StdSales b3 2.96 0.95
z-stat 3.59 1.01
OperCycle b4 1.62 0.97
z-stat 7.26 3.96
Int_Intensity b5 -0.24 -0.11
z-stat -1.23 -0.41
Int_Dummy b6 0.67 0.08
z-stat 2.50 0.26
Cap_Intensity b7 -3.72 -6.27
z-stat -9.27 -17.52
Big-5 b8 0.47 0.56
z-stat 0.79 0.81
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 10.37 -0.49
The sample consists of 6,297 firm-year observations for the years 1992 through 2003. AvgAccr is a firm-level
proxy of conservatism. High values of AvgAccr indicate low conservatism. AvgAccr is the three-year average,
centered at year t, of annual total accruals defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from
operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash flows and are deflated by average
assets. AvgAccr* is average accruals minus discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones model of
Dechow et al. (1995). Totgov is a summary measure of total governance. High (Low) values of Totgov indicate
high (low) antitakeover protection and high (low) CEO involvement in board decisions. The control variables
are measured as follows: LogAssets is the log of total assets at the beginning of the year. StdCFO is the standard
deviation of the firm’s rolling 10-year cash flows from operations ending at the beginning of the year. StdSales is
the standard deviation of the firm’s rolling 10-year sales revenues ending at the beginning of the year. Oper-
Cycle is the log of the sum of the firm’s days of receivables and days of inventory at the beginning of the year.
Int_Intensity is the intangibles intensity measured as the sum of research and development and advertising
expenses scaled by sales at the beginning of the year. Int_Dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if
Int_Intensity = 0 and zero otherwise. Cap_Intensity is the ratio of the gross book value of property, plant, and
equipment to total assets at the beginning of the year. Big-5 is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is
audited by a top 5 auditor and zero otherwise. The regression also includes two-digit SIC industry and year
dummies not reported for parsimony
The (unreported) first stage of the Heckman procedure models governance choice with a dummy variable that
indicates whether the firm has selected to have strong or weak governance. Strong (weak) governance denotes
that the firm has a total governance score below (above) the median of Totgov. The determinants of governance
choice are: size, growth opportunities, firm’s age, presence of large free cash flows, idiosyncratic risk, leverage,
industry concentration, geographic concentration, CEO tenure, firm’s stock performance, whether the firm is
audited by a top 5 auditor, and indicator variables for two-digit SIC industry and year dummies
The reported z-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity and
within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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that the results yield a robust positive association between governance and
conservatism adds support to the hypothesis that, on average, governance uses
conservatism to improve managerial monitoring and control.
5.2 Does governance influence conservatism or vice versa?
Bushman et al. (2004) document an inverse association between measures of the
informativeness of accounting numbers and governance. In particular, they posit
that firms that produce accounting information of limited transparency place a
higher burden in governance structures to overcome this shortcoming. They
measure the informativeness of accounting numbers using earnings symmetric
timeliness, which they define as ‘‘the extent to which current accounting earnings
incorporate current economic income or value relevant information.’’ They find that
earnings symmetric timeliness is negatively associated with current governance
level.19 However, they are unable to rule out the possibility ‘‘that governance
structures also influence the properties of accounting numbers through accounting
policy choices and earnings management activities’’ because their test is an
association test that is not informative about the direction of the causation. They
conclude that their proxy for earnings symmetric timeliness captures a firm
characteristic over which management has little discretion.
In our study, we implicitly assume the direction of causation: stronger
governance leads to more conservative accounting choices. Our findings in the
previous sections document this association. This evidence is necessary, but not
sufficient, to infer the direction of causation. In addition, the discretionary accruals
results in Sect. 5.1 provide support for the hypothesis that governance influences
conservatism by providing a plausible link between the two. Nevertheless, this
evidence is insufficient to draw a meaningful conclusion. To overcome this fact and
illuminate whether governance influences conservatism or vice versa, we incorpo
rate some dynamic features in our tests to obtain more evidence to support our
assumption.
Our first test uses changes in governance. We select a sub sample of firms that
experience a strengthening in governance from time t 1 to time t (that is,
DTotgov \ 0). Then, for the same set of firms, we run regressions (1) and (3) at time
t 1 and at time t and compare the change in coefficient b3. As in previous tests,
we use the Heckman procedure. If governance affects accounting conservatism, we
would expect to observe an increase in the size of b3. The left columns of Panel A in
Table 4 show the results of this test for the Basu regressions and Panel B for the Ball
and Shivakumar accruals regressions. For the Basu regressions, we observe that
when governance improves, b3 increases from 0.04 to 0.08, and this change is
statistically significant (p value = 0.01). For the accruals regressions, b3 increases
19 Notice that our proxies for conservatism—Basu’s (1997) earnings asymmetric timeliness, Ball and
Shivakumar’s (2005) accruals asymmetric timeliness, and Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) average accruals—
are different from the measure for the relevance of accounting numbers used by Bushman et al. Their
measure captures earnings symmetric timeliness, which is closer to what the literature refers to as
relevance.
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from 0.09 to 0.21, and this change is also statistically significant (p value = 0.1). In
the right columns of Table 4, we perform the same tests but use a sub sample of
firms that experience a weakening in governance from t 1 to time t (that is,
DTotgov [ 0). For the Basu regressions, the change in b3 is not significantly
different from zero (p value = 0.33). This result is unexpected and does not allow us
to draw any inference on the direction of causation. The firms in the sub sample
with negative changes in Totgov may have ‘‘excess’’ governance and may simply be
adjusting their governance structures towards the required level without changing
Table 4 Heckman estimation of the change in conservatism when governance changes. Panel A contains
the Heckman estimation of the Basu (1997) regression equation at time t 1 and at time t, when
governance improves (DTotgov \ 0) and when governance worsens (DTotgov [ 0). Panel B contains the
Heckman estimation of the accruals regression of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) at time t 1 and at time t,
when governance improves (DTotgov\ 0) and when governance worsens (DTotgov[ 0)
Panel A: Basu (1997) regressions: Xj = b0 + b1Dj + b2Rj + b3Dj Rj + lj
Dependent variable: Xj
Improvement in governance:
DTotgov\ 0
Worsening in governance:
DTotgov[ 0
j = t 1 j = t j = t 1 j = t
Constant b0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
z-stat 1.06 1.80 4.39 0.57
Dj b1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
z-stat 0.72 3.09 1.81 0.17
Returnj b2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
z-stat 3.91 2.86 2.40 2.20
Dj 9 Returnj b3 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08
z-stat 4.12 7.18 6.70 7.01
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 6.45 4.76 3.65 4.83
p-Value of difference in b3 0.01 0.33
N. obs. 3,452 3,211
Panel B: Accruals regressions: Accrj = b0 + b1DCFOj + b2CFOj + b3DCFOjCFOj + lj
Dependent variable: Accrj
Improvement in governance:
DTotgov\ 0
Worsening in governance:
DTotgov[ 0
j= t 1 j = t j = t 1 j = t
Constant b0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
z-stat 3.80 5.21 4.25 4.00
DCFOj b1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
z-stat 2.87 2.44 2.41 2.56
CFOj b2 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.38
z-stat 8.75 8.95 10.42 12.25
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the level of conservatism. However, when we repeat this test for the accruals
regressions in Panel B, we see that as governance worsens, b3 decreases from 0.17
to 0.04, and this change is statistically significant (p value = 0.05). Overall, these
results are consistent with the hypotheses that governance influences conservatism
and that the association between both is positive.
The structure of the Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) regressions
makes it difficult to test for governance effects when conservatism changes because
these approaches do not estimate a firm level proxy of conservatism. Fortunately,
the Givoly and Hayn average accruals proxy of conservatism does allow for this
type of analysis providing firm year measures of conservatism. We provide further
evidence on the issue of causation by running the following regressions, which are
identical except for the fact that we swap the dependent variable:
Table 4 continued
Panel B: Accruals regressions: Accrj = b0 + b1DCFOj + b2CFOj + b3DCFOjCFOj + lj
Dependent variable: Accrj
Improvement in
governance: DTotgov\ 0
Worsening in governance:
DTotgov[ 0
j = t 1 j = t j = t 1 j = t
DCFOj 9 CFOj b3 0.09 0.21 0.17 0.04
z-stat 1.46 3.43 2.67 0.79
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 3.85 6.03 4.70 4.90
p-Value of difference in b3 0.10 0.05
N. obs. 3,452 3,211
The complete sample consists of 9,152 firm-year observations (1,611 firms) for the years 1992 through
2003. In Panel A, X is earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated
by share price at the beginning of the period. R is the annual stock return measured as the continuously
compounded monthly CRSP return over the firm’s fiscal year. D is a dummy variable that equals one in
the case of bad news (negative or zero of market-adjusted stock rate of return); zero otherwise. In Panel B,
Accr denotes industry-adjusted annual total accruals, deflated by average assets, defined as income before
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the
statement of cash flows. CFO is industry-adjusted cash flow from operations taken from the statement of
cash flows, deflated by average assets. DCFO is a dummy variable equal to one in the case of negative
CFO and zero otherwise. In both Panels, Totgov is a summary measure of total governance. High (Low)
values of Totgov indicate high (low) antitakeover protection and high (low) CEO involvement in board
decisions. The (unreported) first stage of the Heckman procedure models governance choice with a
dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has selected to have strong or weak governance. Strong
(weak) governance denotes that the firm has a total governance score below (above) the median of
Totgov. The determinants of governance choice are size, growth opportunities, firm’s age, presence of
large free cash flows, idiosyncratic risk, leverage, industry concentration, geographic concentration, CEO
tenure, firm’s stock performance, whether the firm is in a regulated industry, whether the firm is in a high
technology-industry, whether the firm is audited by a top Big Five auditor, and indicator variables for the
fiscal year
The reported z-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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AvgAccrt ¼ a1Totgovt1 þ a2Totgovt2 þ a3Totgovt3 þ a4AvgAccrt1
þ a5AvgAccrt2 þ a6AvgAccrt3 þ bControlst1 þ cIndustry dummies
þ dYear dummies þ lt
ð6Þ
Totgovt ¼ a1Totgovt1 þ a2Totgovt2 þ a3Totgovt3 þ a4AvgAccrt1
þ a5AvgAccrt2 þ a6AvgAccrt3 þ bControlst1 þ cIndustry dummies
þ dYear dummies þ lt
ð7Þ
This test is in the spirit of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). We first estimate
regression (6) using the Heckman procedure and assess the joint significance of
coefficients a1, a2, and a3. Table 5 shows that the p value of a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 0
equals 0.07, and the p value of a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 equals 0.04. This provides initial
evidence that governance causes conservatism in a Granger sense. Then we estimate
regression (7) and test the joint significance of a4, a5, and a6. The p value of a4 = 0,
a5 = 0, a6 = 0 equals 0.36, and the p value of a4 + a5 + a6 = 0 equals 0.88. This
evidence indicates that conservatism does not cause governance in a Granger sense.
Taking together the results of both tests, we can conclude that the evidence is
consistent with governance causing conservatism in a Granger sense and not vice
versa.
Table 5 Heckman estimation of the impact of governance on a firm-level proxy of conservatism using a
levels specification
Dependent variable
AvgAccrt Totgovt
Totgovt 1 a1 1.02 0.73
z-stat 2.47 23.94
Totgovt 2 a2 0.20 0.04
z-stat 0.53 1.38
Totgovt 3 a3 0.17 0.11
z-stat 0.54 4.60
AvgAccrt 1 a4 0.61 0.00
z-stat 27.39 1.22
AvgAccrt 2 a5 0.23 0.00
z-stat 9.26 1.72
AvgAccrt 3 a6 0.16 0.00
z-stat 7.42 0.62
LogAssets b1 0.05 0.01
z-stat 0.59 2.68
StdCFO b2 6.51 0.31
z-stat 2.61 1.71
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Table 5 continued
Dependent variable
AvgAccrt Totgovt
StdSales b3 0.93 0.31
z-stat 1.22 1.52
OperCycle b4 0.30 0.00
z-stat 1.44 0.00
Int Intensity b5 0.01 0.01
z-stat 0.04 0.84
Int Dummy b6 0.49 0.01
z-stat 1.87 0.30
Cap Intensity b7 1.15 0.01
z-stat 3.56 0.42
Big-5 b8 0.27 0.04
z-stat 0.38 0.74
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 4.06 2.59
p-Value a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 0 0.07
p-Value a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 0.04
p-Value a4 = 0, a5 = 0, a6 = 0 0.36
p-Value a4 + a5 + a6 = 0 0.88
The sample consists of 5,764 firm-year observations for the years 1992 through 2003. AvgAccr is a firm-
level proxy of conservatism. High values of AvgAccr indicate low conservatism. AvgAccr is the three-
year average, centered at year t, of annual total accruals defined as income before extraordinary items
minus cash flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash flows and
are deflated by average assets. AvgAccr* is average accruals minus discretionary accruals, estimated
using the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995). Totgov is a summary measure of total gover-
nance. High (Low) values of Totgov indicate high (low) antitakeover protection and high (low) CEO
involvement in board decisions. The control variables are measured as follows: LogAssets is the log of
total assets at the beginning of the year. StdCFO is the standard deviation of the firm’s rolling 10-year
cash flows from operations ending at the beginning of the year. StdSales is the standard deviation of the
firm’s rolling 10-year sales revenues ending at the beginning of the year. OperCycle is the log of the sum
of the firm’s days of receivables and days of inventory at the beginning of the year. Int Intensity is the
intangibles intensity measured as the sum of research and development and advertising expenses scaled
by sales at the beginning of the year. Int Dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if Int Inten-
sity = 0 and zero otherwise. Cap Intensity is the ratio of the gross book value of property, plant, and
equipment to total assets at the beginning of the year. Big-5 is an indicator variable that equals one if the
firm is audited by a Big Five auditor and zero otherwise. The regression also includes two-digit SIC
industry and year dummies not reported for parsimony
The (unreported) first stage of the Heckman procedure models governance choice with a dummy variable
that indicates whether the firm has selected to have strong or weak governance. Strong (weak) governance
denotes that the firm has a total governance score below (above) the median of Totgov. The determinants
of governance choice are size, growth opportunities, firm’s age, presence of large free cash flows,
idiosyncratic risk, leverage, industry concentration, geographic concentration, CEO tenure, firm’s stock
performance, whether the firm is audited by a top 5 auditor, and indicator variables for two-digit SIC
industry and year dummies
The reported z-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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Regressions (6) and (7) are based on levels of governance and conservatism. This
type of regression is more likely to be affected by omitted correlated variables and,
because the dependent variables are averaged over three years, they may suffer from
serial dependency problems, which may bias the inferences. To assess the impact of
this possibility, we repeat the tests using changes as follows:
DAvgAccrt ¼ a1DTotgovt1 þ a2DTotgovt2 þ a3DAvgAccrt1 þ a4DAvgAccrt2
þ bControlst1 þ cIndustry dummies þ dYear dummies þ lt
ð8Þ
DTotgovt ¼ a1DTotgovt1 þ a2DTotgovt2 þ a3DAvgAccrt1 þ a4DAvgAccrt2
þ bControlst1 þ cIndustry dummies þ dYear dummies þ lt
ð9Þ
The results of the Heckman estimation of these two equations are presented in
Table 6 and confirm the inferences drawn above and in the initial tests of Table 4:
all the empirical evidence reported in this section is strongly consistent with
governance causing conservatism in a Granger sense and not vice versa.
The findings on this section also rule out an alternative explanation for the
positive association between governance and conservatism. CEOs of firms that
exhibit good performance because of the use of aggressive accounting practices
(that is, low conservatism) may be able to gain substantial bargaining power with
the board and exert significant influence in governance decisions (that is, weak
Table 6 Heckman estimation of the impact of governance on a firm-level proxy of conservatism using a
changes specification
Dependent variable
DAvgAccrt DTotgovt
DTotgovt 1 a1 1.02 0.17
z-stat 2.79 6.98
DTotgovt 2 a2 0.52 0.13
z-stat 1.52 5.61
DAvgAccrt 1 a3 0.17 0.00
z-stat 7.92 1.31
DAvgAccrt 2 a4 0.35 0.00
z-stat 16.80 0.89
LogAssets b1 0.04 0.01
z-stat 0.51 1.83
StdCFO b2 2.59 0.43
z-stat 0.96 2.38
StdSales b3 0.04 0.07
z-stat 0.05 1.24
OperCycle b4 0.67 0.00
z-stat 3.00 0.30
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governance). This would be consistent with the documented positive association
between conservatism and governance and with conservatism influencing gover
nance. However, the results of the previous tests reject this possibility.
Table 6 continued
Dependent variable
DAvgAccrt DTotgovt
Int Intensity b5 0.18 0.01
z-stat 0.89 1.01
Int Dummy b6 0.27 0.01
z-stat 0.91 0.48
Cap Intensity b7 0.91 0.00
z-stat 2.73 0.18
Big-5 b8 0.32 0.02
z-stat 0.41 0.42
Inverse Mills ratio z-stat 3.04 2.03
p-Value a1 = 0, a2 = 0 0.02
p-Value a1 + a2 = 0 0.01
p-Value a3 = 0, a4 = 0 0.24
p-Value a3 + a4 = 0 0.77
The sample consists of 5,764 firm-year observations for the years 1992 through 2003. AvgAccr is a firm-
level proxy of conservatism. High values of AvgAccr indicate low conservatism. AvgAccr is the three-
year average, centered at year t, of annual total accruals defined as income before extraordinary items
minus cash flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash flows and
are deflated by average assets. AvgAccr* is average accruals minus discretionary accruals, estimated
using the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995). Totgov is a summary measure of total gover-
nance. High (Low) values of Totgov indicate high (low) antitakeover protection and high (low) CEO
involvement in board decisions. The control variables are measured as follows: LogAssets is the log of
total assets at the beginning of the year. StdCFO is the standard deviation of the firm’s rolling 10-year
cash flows from operations ending at the beginning of the year. StdSales is the standard deviation of the
firm’s rolling 10-year sales revenues ending at the beginning of the year. OperCycle is the log of the sum
of the firm’s days of receivables and days of inventory at the beginning of the year. Int Intensity is the
intangibles intensity measured as the sum of research and development and advertising expenses scaled
by sales at the beginning of the year. Int Dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if Int Inten-
sity = 0 and zero otherwise. Cap Intensity is the ratio of the gross book value of property, plant, and
equipment to total assets at the beginning of the year. Big-5 is an indicator variable that equals one if the
firm is audited by a Big Five auditor, and zero otherwise. The regression also includes two-digit SIC
industry and year dummies not reported for parsimony
The (unreported) first stage of the Heckman procedure models governance choice with a dummy variable
that indicates whether the firm has selected to have strong or weak governance. Strong (weak) governance
denotes that the firm has a total governance score below (above) the median of Totgov. The determinants
of governance choice are size, growth opportunities, firm’s age, presence of large free cash flows,
idiosyncratic risk, leverage, industry concentration, geographic concentration, CEO tenure, firm’s stock
performance, whether the firm is audited by a top 5 auditor, and indicator variables for two-digit SIC
industry and year dummies
The reported z-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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A final comment seems in order. Our findings should not be interpreted as
contradicting the findings of Bushman et al. (2004). On the contrary, we interpret
our results as complementary. First, they do not measure accounting conservatism
but accounting relevance. And second, firms with noisier accounting environments
beyond the control of management may call for enhanced governance structures
and, as a result of such enhancements, the strengthening in governance leads to
increases in accounting conservatism.
5.3 Impact on conditional conservatism of an exogenous shock to governance
Despite all the evidence presented so far, our tests may still suffer from
endogeneity bias. As a final test, we try to isolate a situation in which an
external shock to governance has occurred. If we found such an instance,
studying what happens to conditional conservatism before and after the shock
could confirm our previous findings. Fortunately, the passage by U.S. legislators
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provides the perfect setting for this
test. The spate of accounting scandals of the early 2000s (Enron, WorldCom,
Adelphia, etc.) led to the passage of SOX. Its main purpose was to ‘‘protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures and
to restore investors’ confidence in the integrity of firms’ financial reporting’’
(Lobo and Zhou 2006). To achieve this purpose, SOX requires CEOs and CFOs
of listed companies to certify the ‘‘material accuracy and completeness of
financial statements.’’ SOX imposes stringent criminal penalties to corporate
officials who knowingly certify financial statements that do not meet its
requirements. These new provisions imply an increase in the level of corporate
governance brought about by factors exogenous to the firm. Lobo and Zhou
(2006) investigate the impact of SOX on accounting conservatism and document
an increase in conditional conservatism following SOX. Their evidence is
consistent with our results.
We use Eqs. 1 and 3 to test whether the passage of SOX has an impact on the
conservatism policies of our sample firms. We isolate a sub sample of firms that are
present in the pre and post SOX periods: that is, years 2001 and 2003. Then we
estimate the Basu and the Ball and Shivakumar regressions and examine whether
there is a significant increase in the coefficient that captures conservatism, b3.
Untabulated results indicate that the average level of governance (as measured by
Totgov) increased by almost 50% from 2001 to 2003. Table 7 contains the results.
For the Basu regression, b3 increases from 0.08 to 0.14, and the p value of this
difference equals 0.04. For the accruals regressions, b3 increases from 0.10 to 0.25,
and the p value of this difference equals 0.08. This evidence reproduces Lobo and
Zhou’s (2006) findings and provides more support to all our previous results and our
prediction of causality: stronger governance monitoring results in an increase in
conditional conservatism.
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5.4 Analysis of the market to book effects on the level of conditional
conservatism
Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) show that it is important to control for the
investment opportunity set when estimating the level of asymmetric timeliness
because variation in growth opportunities can create variation in the estimates of
asymmetric timeliness that is unrelated to conservatism. We use the level of the
market to book ratio (MTB) as a proxy for the investment opportunity set. The MTB
also acts as a proxy for unconditional conservatism. As detailed in Beaver and Ryan
(2005), unconditional and conditional conservatism are inherently linked, higher
unconditional conservatism likely driving the estimates of conditional conservatism
down. To ensure that our results are not driven by differences in the investment
opportunity set or the level of unconditional conservatism, we repeat all the tests in
Table 2, controlling for differences in the MTB ratio. Following Roychowdhury and
Watts (2006), to perform this test, we introduce MTB into Eqs. 1 and 3 in the
following fashion:
Table 7 Estimation of the change in asymmetric timeliness after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Estimation of the Basu (1997) and the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) regression equations, before (year
2001) and after (year 2003) the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Coefficient b3 captures the
level of asymmetric timeliness
Panel A Dependent variable: X Panel B Dependent variable: Accr
Pre-SOX
year 2001
Post-SOX
year 2003
Pre-SOX
year 2001
Post-SOX
year 2003
Constant b0 0.04 0.05 Constant b0 0.01 0.01
t-stat 9.74 7.23 t-stat 1.79 2.49
D b1 0.00 0.03 DCFO b1 0.00 0.00
t-stat 0.33 3.14 t-stat 0.62 0.11
Return b2 0.02 0.01 CFO b2 0.46 0.43
t-stat 1.00 0.61 t-stat 9.25 9.01
D 9 Return b3 0.08 0.14 DCFO 9 CFO b3 0.10 0.25
t-stat 3.09 4.56 t-stat 1.19 3.54
R2 0.07 0.06 R2 0.28 0.20
p-Value difference in b3 0.04 p-Value difference in b3 0.08
The sample consists of 743 firms that are present in the sample in the years 2001 through 2003. In Panel
A, X is earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by share price
at the beginning of the period. R is the annual stock return measured as the continuously compounded
monthly CRSP return over the firm’s fiscal year. D is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of bad
news (negative or zero market-adjusted stock rate of return); zero otherwise. In Panel B, Accr denotes
industry-adjusted annual total accruals, deflated by average assets, defined as income before extraordinary
items minus cash flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash
flows. CFO is industry-adjusted cash flow from operations taken from the statement of cash flows,
deflated by average assets. DCFO is a dummy variable equal to one in the case of negative CFO and zero
otherwise
The reported t-statistics in italics are based on robust standard errors. The two-sided thresholds of the t-
statistics for significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61,
respectively
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Xt ¼ b0 þ b1Dt þ b2MTBt þ b3Rt þ b4DtMTBt þ b5RtMTBt þ b6DtRt
þ b7DtRtMTBt þ lt ð10Þ
Accrt ¼b0 þ b1DCFOt þ b2MTBt þ b3CFOt þ b4DCFOtMTBt þ b5CFOtMTBt
þ b6DCFOtCFOt þ b7DCFOtCFOtMTBt þ lt ð11Þ
Table 8 shows the estimation results of both equations across governance
structures when the sample is partitioned into strong and weak governance firms
at the median of Totgov.20 Even after controlling for MTB, strong governance
firms exhibit more accounting conservatism than weak firms do. The first two
columns of Panel A indicate that the difference in the asymmetric timeliness
coefficients b6 across governance structures is still significant at conventional
levels (p value = 0.00), whereas the difference in b7, the coefficient that captures
the influence of MTB differences on asymmetric timeliness, is not significantly
different from zero (p value = 0.14). Consistent with the results of Roychowdh
ury and Watts (2006), b7 is negatively significant but only for strong governance
firms. The same result is obtained when we estimate in Panel B Eq. 11: the
difference in the asymmetric timeliness coefficients b6 across governance
structures is still significant at conventional levels (p value = 0.02), whereas
the difference in b7, the coefficient that captures the influence of investment
opportunities and unconditional conservatism on asymmetric timeliness, is not
significantly different from zero (p value = 0.33). Overall, the findings in Table 8
confirm that the observed differences in conservatism across governance
structures depicted in Tables 2 and 3 are not driven by differences in the
MTB ratio.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we assess the association between corporate governance and
conditional accounting conservatism. In particular, we investigate whether firms
with strong corporate governance exhibit a higher degree of accounting conserva
tism than firms with weak governance. We measure conservatism using three
proxies. The first one is market based and the other two are accruals based. In our
tests, we control for the endogenous nature of corporate governance and the fact that
governance and conservatism may be simultaneously determined.
We estimate the level of corporate governance using a composite measure that
incorporates the level of antitakeover protection and the level of CEO involvement
20 In these tests we are unable to use the Heckman procedure as described in Sect. 3.3. The reason is that
here we are partitioning the sample into strong and weak governance firms, and the probit regression that
models governance choice cannot be applied to each partition separately. Nevertheless, all previous
evidence indicates that the results are not biased by not taking into account the endogeneity of governance
choice.
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in the decisions of the board of directors. Our governance proxy thus incorporates
external and internal governance mechanisms. It is important to include both as they
have a complementary effect: external governance reinforces the effectiveness of
Table 8 Estimation of the differences in asymmetric timeliness across governance structures after
controlling for the investment opportunity set. The table contains the pooled estimation of the Basu
(1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) regressions, interacted with a proxy for the investment oppor-
tunity set (MTB). The sample has been divided in two groups according to the level of total governance,
Totgov. High (Low) values of Totgov indicate high (low) antitakeover protection and high (low) CEO
involvement in board decisions. Observations below (above) the median of Totgov are referred to as
strong (weak) governance firms: those with low (high) antitakeover protection and low (high) CEO
involvement in board decisions
Panel A Dependent variable: X Panel B Dependent variable: Accr
Strong
Gov.
Weak
Gov.
Strong
Gov.
Weak
Gov.
Constant b0 0.04 0.05 Constant b0 0.00 0.00
t-stat 17.50 26.22 t-stat 1.79 0.55
D b1 0.01 0.00 DCFO b1 0.01 0.01
t-stat 1.81 1.86 t-stat 4.99 3.77
MTB b2 0.00 0.00 MTB b2 0.00 0.00
t-stat 1.38 2.53 t-stat 2.74 1.34
Return b3 0.00 0.02 CFO b3 0.45 0.43
t-stat 0.90 4.83 t-stat 11.97 10.05
D 9 MTB b4 0.00 0.00 DCFO 9 MTB b4 0.00 0.00
t-stat 2.31 0.78 t-stat 2.54 0.97
Return 9 MTB b5 0.00 0.00 CFO 9 MTB b5 0.00 0.01
t-stat 0.09 0.39 t-stat 0.79 1.12
D 9 Return b6 0.12 0.08 DCFO 9 CFO b6 0.33 0.15
t-stat 12.34 8.27 t-stat 6.26 2.34
D 9 Return 9 MTB b7 0.00 0.00 DCFO 9 CFO
9 MTB
b7 0.00 0.01
t-stat 2.13 0.81 t-stat 0.40 0.80
R2 0.11 0.12 R2 0.16 0.24
p-Value diff in b6 0.00 p-Value diff in b6 0.02
p-Value diff in b6+b7 0.00 p-Value diff in b6+b7 0.02
The sample consists of 9,152 firm-year observations (1,611 firms) for the years 1992 through 2003. MTB
is the market-to-book value of equity ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year. In Panel A, X is earnings
per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations deflated by share price at the beginning
of the period. R is the annual stock return measured as the continuously compounded monthly CRSP
return over the firm’s fiscal year. D is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of bad news (negative
or zero market-adjusted stock rate of return); zero otherwise. In Panel B, Accr denotes industry-adjusted
annual total accruals, deflated by average assets, defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash
flow from operations, where both variables are extracted from the statement of cash flows. CFO is
industry-adjusted cash flow from operations taken from the statement of cash flows, deflated by average
assets. DCFO is a dummy variable equal to one in the case of negative CFO and zero otherwise
The reported t-statistics in italics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within-group serial correlation. The two-sided thresholds of the z-statistics for significance at the
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61, respectively
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internal governance and vice versa. Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the
period 1992 through 2003, we find that firms with stronger corporate governance
provisions in place are more conservative, as measured by our three proxies of
conditional conservatism. Specifically, we show that conditional conservatism is
significantly higher for firms with low antitakeover protection and low CEO
involvement in board decisions. This result is robust when controlling for the
investment opportunity set, as it has been shown that differences in asymmetric
timeliness can be driven by differences in growth opportunities that are unrelated to
conservatism (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).
To further investigate the mechanisms managers use to prepare more conser
vative accounting numbers, we also study the impact of earnings discretion on the
sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. Using several
accruals models, we decompose reported accruals into its discretionary and
nondiscretionary components. We find that the increase in accounting conservatism
in strong governance firms is driven by the discretionary component of reported
accruals. This evidence is consistent with strong governance firms using accruals to
accelerate the recognition of bad news in earnings.
We also investigate the direction of causality as our previous findings only
document a positive association between governance and accounting conserva
tism. We find that past governance is associated with current conservatism but not
vice versa and that firms with increases (decreases) in governance also exhibit
increases (decreases) in conservatism. Finally, we isolate an event that resulted in
an exogenous shock to corporate governance, the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act of 2002, and use it to test the impact of changes in governance on changes in
conditional conservatism. We document a substantial increase in conditional
conservatism after the passage of this bill, which confirms all our previous
findings.
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Appendix 1
Determinants of governance choice
We use the two step Heckman (1979) procedure to take into account the
endogenous nature of governance. In the first stage, governance choice is modeled
using a probit model. In particular, we regress a dummy variable that indicates
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whether the firm has selected either to have strong or weak governance on a set of
determinants. We define strong (weak) governance as having values of Totgov
below (above) the median of this variable. In the second stage, we estimate Eqs. 1 9
including as an additional control variable the inverse Mills ratio computed from the
parameters of the first stage. The determinants of governance are taken from
previous literature:
(a) Size. Larger firms are more complex and place higher demands on
governance structures. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that size is signif
icantly associated with ownership concentration. We measure size as the
three year average of the natural logarithm of the market value of equity,
measured at the end of the fiscal year, and predict a positive association with
the quality of governance.
(b) Growth opportunities. Previous research documents that growth opportunities
explain the cross sectional differences in governance configurations. Follow
ing Smith and Watts (1992), our (inverse) proxy for growth is the three year
average of the annual book to market value of assets ratio, measured at the end
of the fiscal year. The market value of assets is defined as the market value of
equity plus the book value of liabilities.
(c) Firm age. Previous research hypothesizes that the age of the firm is related to
the governance structure. Following Bushman et al. (2004), our proxy is the
natural logarithm of the firm’s age at the end of the fiscal year, measured as the
number of years the firm has been public.
(d) Free cash flow. High free cash flow poses a problem for firms with low
growth opportunities, since managers may invest the excess cash in
negative net present value projects or engage in empire building acquisi
tions. Jensen (1986) suggests that governance structures can mitigate this
agency problem. Following Lang et al. (1991), our proxy to capture this
determinant is the three year average of [(operating cash flow minus
preferred and common dividends)/total assets] if the book to market ratio is
greater than or equal to one, and zero otherwise. Firms with book to market
ratios greater than one are expected to have low growth opportunities. The
free cash flow problem demands better governance, therefore we expect to
find a positive association between Free cash flow and the quality of
governance.
(e) Idiosyncratic risk. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the amount of noise
in the firm’s operating environment is expected to increase the costs of direct
monitoring, which in turn increases the demands on governance structures.
These costs are expected to increase at a decreasing rate with the difficulty in
monitoring. Hence, we use the logarithmic transformation of the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the natural logarithm of the
standard deviation of the residual return from a 36 month market model
regression of the firm’s monthly returns on the returns to the CRSP value
weighted market portfolio, imposing a minimum of 12 observations. We
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predict a positive association between Idiosyncratic risk and the quality of
governance.
(f) Leverage. Cremers and Nair (2005) find that internal and external governance
mechanisms are stronger complements in firms with low leverage, because
higher debt reduces the probability of a takeover as the target is less attractive
to the prospective acquirer. This fact reduces the governance usefulness of anti
takeover mechanisms. Our proxy for leverage is the ratio of short and long
term debt to total common shareholders, equity.
(g) Industry concentration and geographic concentration. Bushman et al.
(2004) argue that organizational complexity increases with industry and
geographic diversification. These authors hypothesize and find that the
complexity associated with diversification causes costly governance
responses because the inherent additional managerial difficulties generated
by more complex firms place higher demands on the governance structures.
To control for the level of diversification, we employ the same proxies used
by Bushman et al. (2004). Industry concentration is defined as the three
year average of the sum of the squares of (firm sales in each industry
segment/total firm sales). Geographic concentration is defined as the three
year average of the sum of squares of (firm sales in each geographic
segment/total firm sales). Higher values of these two proxies indicate more
industry/geographic concentration. These two proxies are inverse measures
of diversification; therefore, we expect to find a negative association with
the quality of governance.
(h) CEO tenure. Hermalin (2005) develops a model in which a trend towards more
board diligence leads to shorter CEO tenures. Bushman et al. (2004) find that
the number of years the CEO has been a director is positively associated with
the presence of more inside directors in the board. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1988) find that board independence declines over the course of the CEO’s
tenure. We hypothesize that the number of years the CEO has been in office,
CEO tenure, is another determinant of governance as longer tenures increase
the likelihood of having more insiders in the board. We predict a negative
association between CEO tenure and governance.
(i) Performance. Previous research documents the association between certain
governance attributes and past firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1988) find that the likelihood of independent directors being added to the
board increases following poor firm performance. Similar to Demsetz and Lehn
(1985), to control for past firm performance we use the three year stock return
measured as the continuously compounded monthly CRSP return over 36
months, ending at fiscal year end.
(j) Regulation. The additional monitoring provided by regulators may systemat
ically affect the governance characteristics of firms operating in regulated
environments. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Bushman et al. (2004),
we include an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is a
utility and zero otherwise. We do not control for financial firms because our
sample excludes these firms.
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(k) High tech industry. We also include an indicator variable if the firm is in a
high tech industry (Chandra et al. 2004).
(l) Quality of the auditor. The quality of the auditor may be associated with the
quality of governance (Basu et al. 2001). We define an indicator variable, Big
5, that takes on the value of one if the auditor of the firm is a Big Five auditor
and zero otherwise.
The table below contains the results of the estimation of the first stage probit
regression of a Heckman (1979) model. The sample consists of 9,152 firm year
observations (1,611 firms) for the years 1992 through 2003. The reported z
statistics are based on standard errors which are robust to both heteroscedasticity
and within group serial correlation. The two sided thresholds of the z statistics for
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 confidence levels are 1.64, 1.96, and 2.61,
respectively.
Heckman procedure: first-stage probit regression
Coeff. z-stat
Sizet 1 b1 0.02 1.63
Growth opportunitiest 1 b2 0.21 2.48
Firm aget 1 b3 0.17 7.93
Free cash flowt 1 b4 4.07 4.20
Idiosyncratic riskt 1 b5 0.71 13.54
Leveraget 1 b6 0.02 1.35
Industry concentrationt 1 b7 0.07 1.25
Geographic concentrationt 1 b8 0.26 4.13
CEO tenuret 1 b9 0.03 13.92
Performancet 1 b10 0.03 3.00
Regulationt 1 b11 0.68 12.38
Hi-techt 1 b12 0.03 0.39
Big-5t 1 b13 0.22 6.14
Constant b14 1.86 8.81
Year dummies Yes
As a sensitivity check, we also included additional variables to control for past
accounting performance. In particular, we estimated specifications that included
current and past return on assets, or a variable to reflect the incidence of negative
earnings realizations in the past, calculated as the proportion of losses over the prior
ten years. None of the inferences reported in the tables in the paper is affected by the
inclusion of these variables.
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